Continued,,,,

If additional debt financing is not an option, could Torm alternatively choose to provide liquidity through the sale of ships. In this context, would the remaining four remaining dry bulk carriers have a golden opportunity because of the continued good liquidity in this market, and such a sale would probably be able to bring in $ 130-140 million. and thereby resolve some of the possible liquidity problems in the short term. Much more difficult would it be to turn to (the much larger) tank fleet? for several reasons. First and foremost, the market has been virtually non-existent the past six months, why presume course also would be difficult to find buyers for only a handful of ships. More worrying would be the TORM probably be to clarify the actual trading prices on used tankers and thus compel a NAV value of the company. The latter ceased TORM suddenly and quite convenient to disclose in connection with the Q2 2009 financial statements, which simply referred to as value-added of the fleet and newbuildings as "negative", but also not in a position to get the details, because just the illiquid market for buying and selling of second hand tonnage. With renewed life in this area, created by the TORM itself, it would be harder to escape with this information, and it would also undoubtedly exert heavy pressure on the TORM in terms of write-downs. The reality is that the source of the alleged problems with TORM largely related to the acquisition of 50% of OMI, as we announced in April 2007 almost simultaneously with the product tanker rates peaked out. The cost of $ 782 million. was recognized a value of "tangible assets", ie. In practice, ships of $ 964 million. plus goodwill of $ 88 million. The former, covering a fleet of 22 SR / MR product tankers (including one newbuilding) and 2 LR1 tankers (both bareboat chartered) with a mean age of ca. 4.5 years. Including goodwill paid Mon words approx. USD 45 million. per ship. To put it in relief was there last week for the first time since time immemorial reported a transaction on just the product tanker market, where two SR tankers with delivery direct from the yard was traded to $ 28 million. per ship. At OMI fleet alone would be so easy to write down $ 400 million. Better to give a true picture of the current ship values.

Now the downs, as we know no liquidity draining and it can surely with some justification be argued that the market already inddiskonterer a lower value of the fleet than its book value. Yet it would be critical if it came to taking the Torms recorded loans follows a set of minimum requirements for a particular robustness. A write-down of $ 400 million. the OMI acquisition (and an unknown but probably small amount of the remainder of the existing fleet and new ships) would seems to bring it into conflict with those covenants? and seems to be making a sale of several product ideas as well as impossible unappetizing.

Back as a solution to the liquidity problem (assuming one wants to maintain its autonomy) seems therefore to be only a reserve, which refers to its indebtedness, and horrible market conditions will probably be enormous. And it will follow a prospectus, which seems to still want to force (the negative) value of the fleet to light. But before that happens, shareholders will hopefully have a little time to stand on the sidelines and await developments, at the upcoming reporting on Q3 2009th I would certainly do if I were among them.